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ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF
COMMR-UNICATIONS SATELLITES
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The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 ' is a compromise
which created a new type of legal entity to establish, own, and
operate the United States' portion of a global system of communica-
tions satellites. Although Congress refused to assign the system
exclusively to the private communications carriers, it likewise rejected
any plan to exclude them. Rejected also were single-company owner-
ship and any form of Government ownership or operation. Instead,
Congress created the Communications Satellite Corporation (ComSat),
* The ideas expressed here were revised extensively during my tenure as Fellow
in Law & Economics at Harvard University, 1963-1964, where I benefited from
many valuable suggestions by Professors Carl Kaysen, Donald F. Turner, John R.
Meyer, Phil Areeda, and Paul W. Cherington. Special thanks are due also to Mr.
Mark S. Massel of the Brookings Institution for helpful initial advice, and to Pro-
fessor William S. Vickrey of Columbia University for reviewing strategic parts of the
final argument. Staff members or officials of the international communications car-
riers, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Communications Satellite
Corporation provided generous and crucial expertise. Acknowledgement is due finally
to the assistance of my graduate student, Patricia Anne Lewis. The views expressed
herein are, of course, my own and are not necessarily shared by any of these indi-
viduals or organizations.
t Weller Professor of Economics, Hofstra University. A.B. 1944, Hamilton
College; A.M. 1948, Ph.D. 1953, Columbia University.
1 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, §§ 301-05, 76 Stat. 423-25, 47 U.S.C.
§ 731-35 (Supp. IV, 1963).
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a private joint venture whose corporate stock is available in amounts
prorated by class to American and foreign common carriers, equipment
manufacturers, aerospace companies, and the general public.
The act's overriding objective is the reconciliation of private
ownership and profits with rapid development of a global relay and a
wide diffusion of its benefits. To speed development of the relay the
United States Government will make available, on a reimbursable
basis, booster-launching facilities, space know-how, and basic "research
and development" ("R&D"). To assure wide diffusion of benefits,
international communications rates will be regulated, equipment sup-
pliers are to be assured competitive access, corporation stock is to be
broadly distributed, and service will be provided even to unprofitable
foreign markets when deemed to be in the national interest.
In recognition of the technical and economic barriers to creation
of competing satellite systems and the resulting oligopolistic character
of international telecommunications, the act imposes elaborate direct
controls on this "common carrier's common carrier," more compre-
hensive than present supervision of ordinary communications carriers.
Although the range of economic choices regulated by these controls is
not unparalleled, the regulatory apparatus in its comprehensiveness
and complexity is unprecedented. Most important, the act attempts
to tailor the corporation's internal organization in order to define the
goals toward which management should strive.2
A major question during the coming years will be the degree
to which this experiment in industrial organization can serve as a
prototype in other areas where the Government seeks to divest itself
of sizable investments in scientific enterprise. The answer will depend
on responses to two related questions: Can ComSat's internal antitrust-
regulatory safeguards and the industry's economic structure effectively
reconcile speedy growth of the system with a wide diffusion of its
benefits?- Or will the act be perverted into a vehicle for subterfuge
and sham as predicted by its most outspoken critics?
Thus the Article starts in part I with a brief description of the
emerging economic and regulatory framework of space communication.
2See generally Kaysen, The Corporation: How Much Power? What Scope?,
in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SocIETY 85, 104-05 (Mason ed. 1960). Business
power, of course, can be limited by diffusing it widely, or by subjecting it to external
controls, although wide diffusion still appears to be an unpromising device in interna-
tional communication. The Communications Satellite Act has rather sought to
strengthen direct regulation not so much through increasing the FCC's regulatory
powers, as by spelling out the corresponding duties of other Government bodies. In
the main, however, the act chooses to deal with business power primarily through
"institutionalization within the firm of responsibility for the exercise of power."
Id. at 103.
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES
It proceeds in part II to consider why Congress chose this new type
of joint venture. Review of the rejected alternatives will aid in the
appraisal of ComSats future performance. Finally, and perhaps most
important, part III considers several potential dangers to ComSat's
fulfillment of its sponsors' expectations.
I. THE ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF
SPACE COMMUNICATION
A functioning communications satellite system will involve: de-
livery of messages from customers by conventional means to a central,
interconnected ground station; transmission overseas, or across an
intervening land mass, via satellite relay; reception at a foreign
ground station; interconnection there With conventional communica-
tions systems, and delivery to the public. Each link in the chain is
indispensable, and all links must be technically integrated, especially
for telephone or teleprinter, though not necessarily owned in common.
A satellite facility is strikingly different from existing inter-
continental cables in several ways. First, it serves as a "common
carrier's common carrier," supplementing the existing world-wide
communications network long operated by the American carriers and
their foreign counterparts. Hence it must compete with, as well
as be intergrated into, the older systems which employ submarine
cable, tropospheric scatter, and high-frequency radio. Second, its
installation and continued operation will require expensive Government
launch facilities and complex international agreements on radio fre-
quency assignments and the location of ground stations. Again, the
satellites once launched are almost impossible to repair or modify,
and thus initial technical decisions are frozen into the structure to a
degree rare in other projects. The system's operation in space also
raises unique problems of national sovereignty and private property.
Furthermore, its tremendous communication capability permits such
pioneering endeavors as intercontinental transmission of high-speed
data processing, television, and facsimile, but also produces a serious
problem of excess capacity. Finally, its potential for dissemination of
information in underdeveloped economies promises unique international
opportunities. This, combined with the system's military value and
the American Government's crucial role in space research and rocket
technology, guarantees continued national interest in its early, effective
development.
From the outset, public and private interest in communications
satellites has arisen in partial response to a projected deficiency in
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international communication capability. This "gap" in channel capacity
is variously expected to materialize by 1975, by 1970, or by
sometime "after 1965." ' Such predictions are based on projected
growth rates of present private and governmental use, supplemented
by estimates of new uses in the future, as compared with the expected
future channel capacity of the older nonsatellite systems.
In addition to commercial demand the new satellite facility is
geared to meet diplomatic needs and the alleged requirements of
national prestige in the "cold war," although it seems unlikely that
any private commercial system can forestall establishment of addi-
tional systems to serve "unique" governmental needs.'
The significance of such a system is shaped by the present struc-
ture of the international telecommunications business. Most of the
world's traffic originates or terminates in the United States, and much
of the American business is transacted with Europe and the Near
East. Although nine-tenths of the United States' overseas message
volume in 1961 was telegraph, international telephone accounted for
over two-fifths of the revenues. Telephone channels in that year,
moreover, requiring twenty-two times the bandwidth of telegraph
channels, are estimated to have accounted for over nine-tenths of the
channel requirements for international communication.
Past growth rates suggest that the most rapid expansion of traffic
will be in telex (two-way teletype) and telephone-with telephone
growing the most in absolute terms and telegraph falling sharply in
relative terms. By 1970 United States' overseas telephone calls are
expected to account for one-fourth of the total traffic, telegraph some
two-thirds, and telex the remainder. At that time, revenue shares are
also expected to be one-half for telephone, one-fourth for telegraph,
and the rest for telex and private nonvoice circuits,5 while commercial
television, facsimile, and Government business may possibly add to
the demand for a new broad-band capacity.
3 Hearings on S. 2650 and S. 2814 Before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1962) (Dr. Elmer W. Engstrom,
RCA) [hereinafter cited as Kerr Hearings].
4 During 1961 the Defense Department alone provided $19,000,000 (22%) of an
estimated $88,000,000 earned by American and foreign firms handling overseas tele-
phone calls between the United States and other countries. It also leased about 15%
of all commercial intercontinental circuits in 1962, and a full 25% of those operating
in the North Atlantic. See REIGER, NIcHOLs, EARLY & DEWS, ComuNIcATIoNs
SATELLITES: TECIINOLOGY, ECONOMICS AND SYSTEM CHOICES 77-81, 91 (Rand Memo-
randum RM-3487-RC, Feb. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Rand Memorandum RM-
3487-RC]. Nonetheless the Department is estimated to have conducted a full four-
fifths of its overseas communications business on its own facilities, whose unde-
preciated value then exceeded $1,000,000,000. Id. at 75-77.
5 Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Business Planning Study for a Commercial Tele-
communications Satellite for Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, 1960, pt. I, ch. 3 [herein-
after cited as Lockheed Study].
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The type of system chosen to meet this demand necessarily affects
the potential user, the equipment supplier, and the Government. The
position of each dictates a variant response.
A. The Common Carriers
The nine international common carriers see the satellite as a
potentially inexpensive way to transmit intercontinental messages in
the face of crowded radio frequencies and limited cable capacity. By
far the largest of these carriers-the American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company-dominates the domestic telephone industry, virtually
monopolizes international voice communication, and controls cable
and microwave links for the American radio-television networks.
With its subsidiaries, the company has pioneered in experimental
satellites and space components for orbital and ground station facilities.
To retain control of the satellite link it has persistently opposed
Government ownership and long favored a closed venture limited to
the international common carriers.
Present regulations have left AT&T with a substantial competitive
advantage over her main rivals--eight other carriers largely re-
stricted to record communication.' The two major record carriers-
RCA Communications (which uses mainly radio circuits) and Western
Union (cables)-favor permissive merger policies to facilitate a two-
carrier duopoly in the communications business as a whole instead of
the present unbalanced competitive situation.
The message carriers see communications satellites as a source
of even greater competitive imbalance unless they are guaranteed par-
ticipation on a basis equal to that of AT&T. In their view the
increasingly blurred line between voice and record communication
requires that each carrier be authorized to provide a full range of
service-record, voice, condensed data, television, and facsimile.
Therefore, they have urged Congress to permit them to combine their
domestic and international operations to create a single integrated
carrier (1) to compete with AT&T domestically and internationally,
in both voice and record communication, and (2) so organized, to
6The high standards of Bell Laboratories are well-known. AT&T's competitive
success, however, is due at least in part to existing FCC regulations. While eight
telegraph carriers must compete for international record business, AT&T has a
virtual monopoly of voice traffic. The record companies must also lease AT&T
cables to supplement their own facilities, and are thus dependent on their major
rival. Until recently, moreover, they were excluded from virtually all international
voice communication and thus unable to compete with AT&T for the growing
military market for combined voice-record service.
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participate in the joint ownership of a global satellite system.7 Con-
gress has not yet acted on this proposal and, indeed, is traditionally
opposed to mergers in the international field.8 Consequently, the
problem is still how to guarantee all carriers assured, equitable, and
nondiscriminatory access to a satellite facility affiliated in some fashion
with the industry's most powerful member.
B. The Equipment Manufacturers
Just as the common carriers view the satellite system as an ex-
tension of their existing technology, some sixty "hardware companies"
which manufacture the equipment needed for space devices, ground
stations, and booster facilities naturally view the system as a market
for their outputs. In addition to such independent manufacturers as
General Electric, Lockheed, Bendix, etc., many of the carriers main-
tain wholly-owned manufacturing subsidiaries. Because the sub-
sidiaries are not regulated, it may be feared that their carrier parents
may recoup on the equipment-producing side of the enterprise what
they forgo in their regulated activities. At issue also is the strategic
disadvantage of other hardware manufacturers in supplying a satellite
system in which, unlike their rivals, they or their parent companies are
not owners.
The more numerous the hardware suppliers who are willing and
able to contract with the National Aeronautics & Space Administration
(NASA) or ComSat for research or hardware assignments, the greater
is the possibility of avoiding excessive reliance on any single integrated
common carrier. The hardware companies, however, are hardly
likely to risk substantial venture capital, or even to participate ex-
tensively as Government contractors, without some assurance that
they will be able subsequently to sell to the operating system on a
fair and equitable basis. The issue posed, once more, is whether
equitable access requires outright participation in ownership by all
competing companies in addition to special internal safeguards.
"t See Hearings on S. Res. 258 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 390-92, 449-50, 458-60 (1962) (David Sarnoff,
RCA; Samuel M. Barr, Western Union) [hereinafter cited as Kefauver Hearings I] ;
cf. id. at 409. See generally id. at 456-64; Kerr Hearings 78-89 (Engstrom);
Hearings on S. 2814 and S. 2814, Amendment, Before the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 282-84 (1962) (Barr) [hereinafter cited as Pastore
Hearings II].
S In a landmark decision, however, the FCC recently authorized the record car-
riers to share in joint ownership of a fourth transatlantic cable capable of handling
combined voice-record services of the sort previously open only to AT&T. See FCC
Public Notice No. 48671, March 17, 1964; FCC Mimeo No. 48733, March 17, 1964.
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES
C. The Government
The State Department, NASA, and the Federal Communications
Commission must play crucial roles in establishing and regulating
any global satellite system, no matter who is the legal owner of the
system.
While it is established that NASA is to provide all booster and
tracking facilities, the bulk of basic R&D, advice on the system's tech-
nical characteristics and on its compatibility with conventional facili-
ties, a number of economic and political determinations still remain
to be made. Are booster facilities to be leased at full or less than
full cost, with or without allocable overhead and/or recovery of some
portion of development costs? Flat fees may be charged for each
launching, or royalties could be collected annually from the revenues
earned.
Foreign policy problems are also posed by the system's inter-
national organization. The possibility exists that NASA's fees might
be charged in part to underdeveloped countries least able to pay. In
addition the State Department must work closely with the Federal
Communications Commission and any satellite corporation in foreign
negotiations on interconnection and frequency allocation. It must
also approve any assistance to underdeveloped countries for improving
their domestic communications systems and, eventually, for building
ground stations. The line between business and political-foreign policy
matters may be thin.' Hence, close cooperation between the State
Department and the corporation will be necessary in such delicate
matters as determining the location of ground stations abroad,
dividing revenues and allocating costs (including development costs)
among foreign partners in a global system, relations with the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), negotiations with
the Soviet Union, and accommodating the Government's needs for
global channel capacity for military and diplomatic communications.Y0
9 See Estep, Some International Aspects of Communications Satellite Systems,
58 Nw. U.L. REv. 237, 249-57 (1963).
10 Doubts have been raised as to whether public and private functions can in
fact be separated. For example, can the United States avoid responsibility for over-
seas actions of the corporation in view of the corporation's three presidentially-
appointed directors? Will such appointments, along with other extensive Govern-
ment involvement, create an impression among small investors that the Government
has endorsed the corporation as a good investment risk? See generally Hearings on
H.R. 11040 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
346-70 (1962) (Benjamin V. Cohen, State Dep't) [hereinafter cited as Sparkman
Hearings]; SCHWARTZ & GOLDSEN, FOREIGN PARTI cIPATION IN COMMUNICATIONS
SATELLITE SYSTEMS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ACT OF
1962, at 17-20, 53-56 (Rand Memorandum RM-3484-RC, Feb. 1963) [hereinafter
cited as Rand Memorandum RM-3484-RC].
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The FCC, through its jurisdiction over all common carriers,
including its power to approve extensions of their communication
facilities, controls their right to participate in any satellite relay. In
addition the Commission must license all American ground stations,
negotiate with ITU for radio frequency allocations, and arrange for
interconnection with remote foreign points when deemed in the national
interest. Besides working closely with NASA in establishing technical
standards, the FCC's role will be crucial in rate regulation and the
policing of competitive procurement.
Such overlapping jurisdictions may create serious administra-
tive-regulatory problems," especially since the different agencies view
the satellite system differently. The Defense Department sees it as
a potential military resource; the FCC, as an adjunct to existing
common carrier facilities, a "cable in the sky"; the State Department
and the United Nations, as a unique means to hasten the growth of
underdeveloped nations, and even as a safeguard against war through
misinformation or accident. It is not surprising that the present act
has already been criticized for failing to provide adequately for
coordination among the various agencies involved.' 2
D. National Goals
As mentioned earlier, national policy towards space communica-
tions seeks to promote rapid growth, wide diffusion, and private
ownership and operation.13
"Growth" includes the development of the underlying rocket
technology and communications components for both orbital facilities
and ground stations. It also includes the physical establishment of all
components of a global facility, including ground stations in under-
developed countries. The policy of promoting rapid growth has
tended to imply a rate of development in excess of that warranted by
projected divergences between the expected supply of and demand
for channel capacity.
11 On the relations between ComSat and various Government bodies, see id.
at 57-59.
12 Rosenblum, Regulation in Orbit: Administrative Aspects of the Communica-
tions Satellite Act of 1962, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 216, 233-34 (1963). See generally
Rand Memorandum RM-3484-RC, at 57-59.
13 Private ownership has been preferred from the outset insofar as consistent
with other national goals. See Communications Satellite Act of 1962, §§ 102(a)-(c),
76 Stat 419, 47 U.S.C. §§ 701 (a)-(c) (Supp. IV, 1963); Statement of President
Kennedy on Communications Satellite Policy, Section A, in Hearings on Space
Communication and S.J. Res. 32 Before the Communications Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as Pastore Hearings I].
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"Diffusion of benefits" is dependent upon potential economies
in international (and ultimately domestic) communication, with re-
sultant rate reductions for potential users. The ultimate beneficiary
should be the final consumer who utilizes the communications services
of the common carriers which reap the immediate benefits of the
system. "Diffusion" also encompasses equal and unrestricted oppor-
tunity for all equipment manufacturers to supply the satellite system
and full access by all users and suppliers to all results of Government-
supported R&D.
An overriding regulatory problem is reconciliation of conflicts
among the various national objectives. To justify the huge Govern-
ment investments in R&D and booster technology, the widest diffusion
of benefits at home and abroad is essential.' 4 Yet service to less-
developed countries may unavoidably increase charges to the general
user above those which would result if service were limited to high-
traffic areas only. Rapid development of the system may conflict with
efforts to establish the kind of organizational structure most conducive
to competition.' 5 American foreign policy goals may conflict with an
economically efficient pricing of satellite channels.' Efficient spectrum
usage favors low-altitude random systems,17 while other factors favor
the high-altitude synchronous type.'
8
14 Communications satellites involve special international considerations because
of their capacity to provide a global, multilateral communication service, as opposed
to the bilateral service by cable and point-to-point radio. Remote, underdeveloped
areas, no less than advanced nations, can be closely connected with the outside
world. New forms of foreign aid may emerge through technical assistance to remote
areas for development of their internal communications systems. Global satellite
communication may enhance international understanding through opportunities for
public confrontation of national leaders and for the spreading of literacy and edu-
cation. Finally, joint undertakings with Communist nations may demonstrate a peace-
ful and cooperative approach to space exploration. See Pastore Hearings II, at
151-60 (McGhee, Dep't of State). See generally Hearings on Space Satellite
Communications Before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Small Business, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 82-87 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Long Hearings I].
Such programs, however, will not materialize in the near future. A major
source of long-run demand for intercontinental service is expected to be television
and high-speed data transmission for which technical facilities are not yet available
in underdeveloped areas. Time and language differences clearly limit the usefulness
of global television circuits. American educational-informational objectives can also
be promoted through taped television or through documentary film exhibition. Over-
land microwave links with the major terminal stations elsewhere may be a more
practical way to help underdeveloped countries than direct global interconnection.
See Johnson, The Commercial Uses of Communications Satellites, Cal. Management
Rev., Spring, 1963, p. 55; Meckling, The Economic Importance of Space Technology,
Rand Corporation Statement No. 17, May 9, 1962.
15 See pp. 325-33, 337-40 infra.
16 See pp. 349-56 infra.
17 See notes 35, 38 infra.
18 See pp. 327-31 infra.
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To the extent that conflicts between various goals cannot be
eliminated, compromises naturally must be made. The central issue,
however, is whether these and other contradictions are inherent in
aniy satellite system, or to what extent institutional design may
exacerbate or minimize them.
Any satellite corporation necessarily must retain considerable
discretion over the location of its ground stations, the rate at which
new techniques and orbital components are innovated, the level and
structure of rates, the selection of its suppliers, and the accommodation
of potential users. It will be difficult to ensure that such discretion
is used to reconcile the divergent goals of national space policies with
each other and with acceptable short and long-run profits. It remains
to be seen whether the nation's "chosen instrument"-ComSat---can
accomplish this task better than the rejected options, or even adequately.
II. THE ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICE
In creating ComSat as a joint venture subject to Government
influence, but owned and operated by broad-based private interests,
Congress rejected a number of alternatives, including a completely
governmental project along the lines of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion "9 or the Tennessee Valley Authority,"0 and varied suggestions
of purely commercial joint ventures 2 ' and single-company operations.
In outline its choice apparently resulted from these presumptions:
(1) National interest and foreign policy objectives require
the development of a global satellite system at a rate more
rapid than mere commercial considerations would dictate.
(2) Technical-economic barriers preclude the establishment
of more than one system in the foreseeable future. There-
fore, a choice must be made among single-company owner-
ship, a joint venture, or a Government-owned system.
19 NASA would have been authorized to establish the satellite component.
Title would have remained with the Government, but private contractors, operating
the system for a fee, would have built their own ground stations and then con-
tracted with the operators for access to the system's channels. Sparkman Hearings
269-71, 278, 351-52, 356-66 (Senator Wayne Morse; Hugh L. Dryden, NASA;
Joseph L. Rauh; Cohen). For a modified version see Kefauver Amendment to
S. 2814, in Pastore Hearings II, at 11, 19-20.
20A Government corporation, after establishing the system (satellites plus
stations), would have operated it, renting channels to potential users. See S. 2890,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(c) (1962), in Hearings on S. Res. 258 Before the Sub-
committee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 262 (1962) (Kefauver Amendment to S. 2814) [hereinafter
cited as Kefauver Hearings I] ; Pastore Hearings II, at 17-27.
21 p. 337 infra.
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(3) A joint venture is preferable to single-company owner-
ship mainly because the latter would probably create in-
superable obstacles to equitable access and a wide diffusion
of benefits.
(4) A joint venture is preferable also to any Government-
owned system in view of the nation's long preference for
private ownership and operation of communications, espe-
cially since the satellite relay is conceived as an adjunct to
conventional common carrier facilities.
(5) The main issue therefore is the form of a joint venture
and the safeguards to be imposed.
(6) The superior antitrust-regulatory safeguards of a broad-
based venture make it preferable to a consortium of carriers,
and its superior access to resources and know-how better
recommend it than a joint venture limited to newcomers.
In a broad-based venture internal organizational arrange-
ments can be instituted which, without obstructing speedy
growth, can cope with potential impediments to a wide
diffusion of benefits."
We proceed to examine the validity of each assumption.
A. The Need for Speedy Development
If time had been no concern the country might have waited until
the market could support: (1) more than one independent private
satellite system; (2) a variety of systems, public or private, high or
low altitude; or (3) a single joint venture limited to newcomers with
no interests in communications or equipment manufacturing. By the
sacrifice of some speed, Congress might have chosen a more com-
petitive instrument than the special type of joint venture finally
created.2
There was, in fact, wide agreement in 1962 that commercial
considerations alone would not produce, within the next decade, the
investment needed for a global relay. Although some projections
show demand for communication circuits exceeding supply by 1970 or
1975, unpredictable improvements in cable technology may allow
increased traffic without new capital expenditures until an even later
date. 4 Since a single stationary satellite over the Atlantic could
2 2 These impediments are considered pp. 338-49 infra.
23 See YAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY-AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 140 (1959).
24 For example, the first transatlantic cable in 1956 had an initial capacity of
thirty-six voice channels. The latest has a capacity of 128 channels, or, with
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provide as much global channel capacity as existed in 1962, the
probability of long-run unused capacity was readily apparent.
If commercial viability was remote at that time, however, the
value of a satellite relay for military-foreign policy purposes was not.
Radar blackouts, radio outages (due to sun-spots), and hostile jam-
ming techniques combined to point up the need for a global system.
Meteorology and weather prediction stood to benefit. Most important,
national prestige urged rapid development: the United States was
unwilling to grant the Soviet Union a lead in space technology. The
chance of a spectacular peace-time "break-through" (e.g., satellite
communication) had long looked attractive, as did the opportunity to
recoup quickly incidental civilian benefits from the country's huge
investment in rocket technology.
But the desirability of speedy development does not explain the
selection of the joint venture form. Congress might still have in-
stituted a Government-owned system or simply permitted the FCC
to license a single-company venture. In fact Congress rejected both
of these alternatives partly because the alleged technical-economic
barriers to establishment of more than one competing system argued
in favor of the most representative single system. Other options might
have appeared more attractive if additional systems had been expected
to follow soon thereafter.
B. Barriers to Multiple Satellite Systems
High capital costs, spectrum scarcities, and the vast channel
capacity of a single system allegedly create severe barriers to addi-
tional satellite systems. While these entry barriers may be inherent
in communications satellites however organized, the height of these
barriers appears to be determined to a large extent by the form of
the original system. Where both components of the original global
relay-satellites and ground stations-are jointly owned, the barriers
to multiple entry are highest, but even here are insuperable only in
the short-run.
three TASI transmitters, a limit of 239 voice trunks. As a result, cost-per-mile-per-
voice-trunk fell between 1956 and 1963 to one-seventh the original amount. Addi-
tional technological improvements may reduce cost-per-voice-channel to only one-
third the cost of the second generation cable. NICHOLS, SUBMARINE TELEPHONE
CABLES AND INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 12 (Rand Memorandum RM-
3472-RC, Feb. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Rand Memorandum RM-3472-RC]. AT&T's
projected fourth generation cable is expected to provide at least 720 voice circuits
by 1966, and to reduce costs-per-voice-channel to a mere 5% of those in the first
cable. See NIcHOLS, HIGH CAPACITY SUBMARINE TELEPHONE CABLES: IMPLICATIONS
FOR COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 2-6 (Rand Memoran-
dum RM-3877-NASA, Sept. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Rand Memorandum RM-3877-
NASA].
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1. High Capital Costs
For joint ownership of both components, capital costs were
estimated in 1962 at 400-500 million dollars exclusive of booster and
tracking facilities.2 5  However, more recent estimates (Table I)
show considerable variations in capital costs responsive to such factors
as the type of system, the length of satellite orbital life, the probability
of launch success, and the character of the ground station equipment.
Furthermore, the size of the United States' burden necessarily varies
with the extent of foreign participation.
Even if one assumes exclusive American ownership of both
components, most estimates of initial investment in Table I fall well
within the very high capital requirements for optimal-size plants in
steel, automobiles, and petroleum refining. 6 Foreign-ownership par-
ticipation in a global system would make single-company ownership
of the United States' portion look even less fanciful." Although each
carrier or aerospace-hardware company would hardly construct its
own system, there may well be firms among them with sufficient re-
sources and know-how to do so single-handedly, or in small groups.
In that case the absolute capital requirements for a global system,
though impressive, did not ipso facto rule out single-company owner-
ship or the possibility of more than one system.
The time that would be required to raise venture capital of such
magnitude was a more serious matter. The shorter the development
period which national policy permitted, the more difficult it would be
for any but the largest and most experienced enterprises to do the
job alone. With additional time the profit potential of a global
system might enable other less-established firms to raise the needed
capital.
If satellite and ground-station components were to be separately-
owned, on the other hand, wider participation by individual carriers
was possible, since different companies might operate different links.
2 5 Lockheed's long-run estimate for a high-altitude, two-satellite synchronous
system with twenty ground stations, including the satellite replacement program
through 1980, was $435,000,000 including $122,400,000 for the stations and their
personnel through 1967. Lockheed Study 67-69. General Electric estimated that a
low-altitude random system with ten satellites and twenty ground stations would
cost from $400,000,000 to $500,000,000 by 1980, allocated equally between the ground
stations and the satellites. Hearings Before the House Committee on Science and
Astronautics, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 19, pt. 1, at 154, 159 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Brooks Hearings].
2 6 BAIx, BaRRmRs To NEW COmpITION 158 (1956). Individual ground stations
in the random system will probably cost less than optimal-size plants in such indus-
tries as rayon, liquor, cement, tires and tubes, or soap. Ibid.
27AT&T and the British Post Office are jointly expected to spend some
$363,000,000 on new submarine cable between 1963 and 1965, a sum at least com-
parable to the cost of establishing any of the systems cited in Table I. See Rand
Memorandum RM-3472-RC, at 32-34; id. at 25-27.
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TABLE I
ILLUSTRATIVE COST ESTIMATES FOR EARLY GLO3AL SATELLITE SYSTEMIS 
2 8
(includes satellites, terminal stations, data
& management center)
Type of System
RANDOM
Ground Equipment (16
stations, antenna, data
& management
center) 31
Satellites
18 RA (9 RA)
18 RB (9 RB)
18 RC (9 RC)
36 RC
Total Costs 
3 2
18 RA (9 RA)
18 RB (9 RB)
18 RC (9 RC)
36 RC
STATIONARY (Synchronous)
Ground Equipment (16
stations, antenna, data
& management
centers) 33
Satellites
6 SB (3 SB)
6 SC (3 SC)
9 SC
Total Costs 
3 4
6 SB (3 SB)
6 SB (3 SC)
9 SC
Initial
In-Service Investment
Time (%) ($ millions)
159.7
98.2 (86.5) 84.9
74.3
66.0
132.0
244.6
234.0
226.0
291.7
(42.4)
(37.1)
(33.0)
(202.1)
(196.8)
(192.7)
26.6
100. (100.) 126.0 (63.0)
78.8 (39.4)
118.1
152.6 (89.6)
105.4 (66.0)
144.7
Annual
Operating
Costs 
2 9
($ millions)
40.0
84.9 (42.4)
37.1 (18.6)
13.2 ( 6.6)
26.4
124.9 (82.4)
77.1 (58.6)
53.2 (46.6)
66.4
6.7
126.0 (63.0)
26.3 (13.1)
39.4
132.7 (70.7)
33.0 (19.8)
46.1
Level
Anntal
Costs3 0
($ millions)
98.4 (49.2)
46.2 (23.1)
20.2 ( 10.1)
40.3
167.0 (117.8)
114.8 (91.7)
88.8 (78.7)
108.9
11.5
146.2 (73.1)
35.1 (17.5)
52.6
157.7 (84.6)
46.6 (29.0)
64.0
28 For derivation of all cost estimates see Rand Memorandum RM-3487-RC,
at 37-56. Cost estimates for each of the two basic systems-random and stationary-
are based on assumptions regarding: (a) number of satellites in orbit; (b) effective
lifetime of satellites in orbit; (c) satellites' launch-success probability; (d) number
and type of terminal stations. Symbols are as follows:
R-Random System S-Stationary (Synchronous) System
Year A-in near future
Year B-some years later than A when launch probabilities and orbital
lifetime improved
Year C-a later year, with further improvements.
Symbols can therefore be read as follows: 36 RC means "a system of 36 low-altitude,
random-orbiting satellites, at year C"; 3 SB means "a system, of three stationary,
high-altitude satellites at year B," etc. Estimated costs of ground stations, antenna
combinations, data and management centers follow model in Rand Memorandum.
2 9 Refers to annual operating costs of ground stations and annual replacement
costs of satellites.
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Comparative cost estimates for synchronous and random systems 35
in Table I are instructive. The satellite component of an early syn-
chronous system has been estimated to cost several times more than
the same component for a contemporaneous random system. However,
since the cost of the ground-station component would be only one-fifth
or one-sixth as large, the cost of individual stations would be well
within the capabilities of individual carriers."6
Insofar as a random system seemed by far the more practical
in 1962, the national commitment to speedy development contributed
substantially to the entry barrier of high capital costs. Moreover, in
view of the far greater fixed cost of a random system's ground
stations, the random system offered far greater scale economies
with consequently increased danger of cutthroat ground station com-
petition. Thus relatively few carriers could be expected to build
their own terminals in a random system. Joint ownership of satellites
and stations by the same entity therefore seemed to some carriers
essential for equal access.17 For that reason, too, the system's capital
costs then became more prohibitive.
30o Level annual costs are based on a 15-year period at 16% interest. They are
derived from initial placement costs on the assumption that a system of any given
lifetime would be replaced entirely by the end of its lifetime. Conversion of capital
outlays and annual operating costs into "level annual costs" facilitates comparisons of
systems whose costs may be distributed differently over the system's lifetime.
Rand Memorandum RM-3487-RC, at 49-50.
31 Id. at 48, table II.
32 Includes costs of terminal stations and data & management center, cost of
initial set of satellites placed in orbit, and annual replacement costs after system
has operated for a few years.
33 See id. at 48, table II.
34 Note 32 supra.
35 A random system consists of some fifteen to forty relatively simple satellites
in random orbit of about 6,000 nautical miles altitude. Ground stations can com-
municate with each other only when an orbiting satellite comes into the "line-of-
sight!' of any pair of stations. Hence, ideally, a sufficient number of satellites must
be orbited to enable every pair of stations always to be within the "line-of-sight"'
of at least one satellite. A synchronous or stationary system consists of relatively
complex satellites in equatorial orbits of 19,300 nautical miles altitude. Because the
movement of such satellites corresponds to the earth's, they will appear stationary
to each ground station. Virtually all inhabited portions of the globe can be covered
by three synchronous satellites, if properly placed. Rand Memorandum RM-3487-RC,
at 5-12, 27-29, 33-36.
36 Ground stations for a random system may cost an average of some $9,400,000
each, excluding annual operating costs of approximately $2,400,000. This contrasts
with capital outlays of a mere $1,300,000 per station in a synchronous system, plus
some $325,000 in annual operating costs. Id. at 47-48.
3 7 Western Union, for one, was fearful that AT&T might funnel a large volume
of business through its own ground stations, thereby undercutting any other car-
rier's stations. To remain free of further dependence on her main rival, Western
Union therefore urged that all American ground stations together with the satellite
segment itself be owned by the same consortium. Hearings on Space Satellite
Communications Before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select Sub-
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2. Spectrum Scarcities
Technical spectrum scarcities constitute a second impediment to
multiple satellite systems. Space communication now requires wide-
frequency bandwidths, although improved booster technology and
heavier satellites operating with greater power may alter the situation.
For the present, therefore, we confront the anomaly of a technique
which may ultimately raise channel capacity several-fold, but which
initially constitutes an uneconomic use of the spectrum.3"
Spectrum scarcities may grow more serious as the additional
military-meteorological satellite systems now planned come into
operation, although again technological change eventually may facilitate
an accommodation of these other systems."9  More important than
technical scarcities, however, is the present inadequacy of the ad-
ministrative techniques by which frequencies are allocated nationally
and internationally. A single satellite system would greatly ease the
regulatory problems in such matters as frequency sharing between
earth and space, frequency registration and utilization, avoidance of
interference, and international frequency negotiations.
3. Multilateral Character of the Service
A further factor militating against multiple satellite systems is
the multilateral character of the international negotiations required
for communications operations among various countries with conflict-
ing interests. The old bilateral relations between countries with
cable and radio circuits more easily permitted separate competing
operations in the United States.
committee on Small Businwss, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 578-79 (1961) [here-
inafter cited as Long Hearings II]; Kefauver Hearings II, at 446-54; Pastore Hear-
ings II, at 281-82. Other parties inferentially proposed joint ownership of stations
and satellites provided that the carriers held both, but separate ownership where
noncarriers or mixed interests held the satellite segment. Id. at 224-26 (Dr. Henri
G. Busignies, IT&T), 242-44 (Joseph Beirne, CWA) ; see notes 62-63 infra.
38A synchronous system would create even greater difficulties at first. The
present random system, with considerably less channel capacity than a future high-
altitude synchronous type, will permit greater re-use of particular frequencies by
different pairs of ground stations, an advantage not offset by a synchronous system's
lesser interference with conventional (earth-bound) facilities. See Brooks Hearings
317-20 (James E. Dingman, AT&T).
89 The United States' proposals for 2,975 megacycles of spectrum space could
ultimately accommodate a maximum of 200,000 voice channels. Less efficient usage
of the spectrum seems unavoidable at the outset, however, for optimal use of weak
satellite power. True, the new microwave technology permits close beaming of
point-to-point signals and, thus, far more intensive utilization of the spectrum than
do the older high frequency or mobile radio techniques. Even so, wideband modula-
tion today requires twenty times the bandwidth which an improved single sideband
transmission is eventually expected to need. At present, therefore, only some
10,000 voice channels could be accommodated in any major geographic area. See
generally Rand Memorandum RM-3487-RC, at 3-4, 18.
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4. Magnitude of Channel Capacity
Perhaps the most serious barrier to multiple satellite systems, at
least for the foreseeable future, is the excess channel capacity of a
single, system relative to cost and market demand. More than any
other factor, this consideration confirms Congress' doubts about the
likelihood of multiple commercial entry.
For example, it was estimated in 1960 that a low-altitude global
system of twenty satellites and twenty-six ground stations would
provide some 7,800 voice channels by 1970. Such capacity was far
in excess of: (1) global capacity in 1960 of only 543 voice channels
(691 voice trunks) ; o (2) liberal predictions that only 4,650 channels
would be needed by 1970-a figure, however, that far exceeded the
1,475 effective cable circuits expected in that year. Even in 1975
this twenty-satellite random system would almost satisfy the expected
requirement of 8,000 channels without considering the 1,750 cable
channels also anticipated.4
Yet the low-altitude random system was widely believed to be
technically inferior to a high-altitude synchronous system. It was
estimated that the latter, operating with a single satellite over the
Atlantic, would yield more than 1,000 voice channels. Some estimates
were as high as 4,800 channels, depending on the type of satellite
used. This compares with trans-Atlantic submarine cable capacity in
1962 of only 200 voice channels, estimated capacity of 600 channels
by 1970, and anticipated needs of some 900 channels by that time.
Some of the projected two-satellite synchronous systems would far
exceed the maximum anticipated channel requirements in 1970 for
trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific traffic.
42
40 The difference between numbers of voice channels and numbers of voice trunks
reflects the employment of so-called TASI transmitters on both ends of the trans-
Atlantic cables. TASI units by facilitating the use of pauses in telephone communi-
cation enable a voice channel to transmit more intelligence than otherwise. See
Rand Memorandum RM-3472-RC, at 22-23.
41Estimates in this paragraph are drawn from Report of the Ad Hoc Carrier
Committee Inquiry Into Administrative and Regulatory Problems of Commercially
Operable Space Communications Systems, No. 14024, FCC, March 29, 1961, in
Pastore Hearings I, 203, 222-23; Rand Memorandum RM-3472-RC, at 22-23, 26-27;
Lockheed Study 64A. AT&T actually estimated global capacity in 1961 as 550
circuits, needs by 1970 as 3,000, and trans-Atlantic requirements at 1,400. The com-
pany proposed an initial system of thirty satellites in 7,000-mile polar orbits, each
satellite providing 2,400 voice channels, or four program-quality television channels.
Sufficient satellites would be added ultimately to assure that two were always mutually
visible from each pair of ground stations. Brooks Hearings 313, 320-22 (Dingman).
42 A two-satellite synchronous system (over the Atlantic and Pacific), with
twenty ground stations, was estimated to provide 2,000 channels by 1970 (at a
cost of $420,000,000) and 5,000 channels by 1980 (at a cost of $495,000,000). This
capacity would more than meet expected needs by 1980 of 5,870 channels in those
areas when added to expected cable capacity of 1,130 channels. See Lockheed Study
64-A, 67-70, app. E(5). Other estimates in the paragraph are drawn from KLEiN,
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None of these or other early estimates predicted a commercially
solvent global system until 1970 or 1975. In fact the long period of
losses has frequently been cited to justify inclusion of satellite invest-
ment in the common carrier's rate base, or even to warrant an overt
Government subsidy. In view of the further possibility that technical
improvements may enhance the channel capacity of satellite as well as
cable links, the economic feasibility of more than one commercial
system seems especially doubtful. Perhaps the most that we can
anticipate in the near future is a single viable satellite link between
the United States and Western Europe.
Thus serious barriers to multiple systems did exist in 1962,
obstacles which the desire for rapid development undoubtedly ag-
gravated. A joint venture, however, was not the only solution. A
single system could have been launched by a single company or
by the Government itself.3
C. Rejection of Single-Company Ownership
Among private companies, AT&T was obviously in the best
position to develop the system. Her early success with Telstar indi-
cated both the capacity and desire for vigorous independent action.4
To the promise of rapid development the company added great
financial resources which might have been considerably augmented
by such foreign participants as the British Post Office. Furthermore,
with foreign ownership of the portions of the system outside the
United States, 45 even the costly single ownership of both ground station
and satellite components would have been quite possible, especially
if NASA charged no more than marginal launching costs for booster
and tracking facilities.
GOLDSEN, LIPsoN, MECKLING, MOORE & REIGER, COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES AND
PUBLIC POLICY: AN INTRODUCTORY REPORT 18-21 (Rand Memorandum RM-2925-
NASA, Dec. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Rand Memorandum RM-2925-NASA];
Rand Memorandum RM-3472-RC, at 26-27.
4sAt the outset the satellite's two principal users will undoubtedly be AT&T
and the Government. Sole ownership by either might guarantee more certain and
adequate use of the facility. AT&T, for example, would be less tempted to with-
hold its business in the hope of forcing an under-utilized facility to price itself out
of the market if it owned the facility outright. The Government, on the other
hand, might be less likely to divert confidential military-diplomatic traffic to a sepa-
rate Government-owned system under sections 102(d) and 201(a)(6) of the act
if the facility which private companies used was itself Government-owned.
44 AT&T's vital interest in satellites had become public knowledge by the time
it signed a cooperative agreement with NASA for booster and launch facilities on
July 27, 1961. The advantages and disadvantages of a single-company venture were
examined in Rand Memorandum RM-2925-NASA, at 111-120. The option was also
considered in passing in Long Hearings I, at 5-9.
45 The extent of foreign participation would depend on the opportunities and
incentives for common market and Soviet-bloc countries to establish their own
systems and the degree to which the United States' lead in missile technology and
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Despite these considerations, opposition to single-company owner-
ship was overwhelming in view of its threat of monopoly with con-
comitant antitrust and regulatory problems. The Government's space
program was viewed as a huge investment whose gains could be fully
justified only by wide diffusion." Regulation of a single-company
system would fall to the FCC, and there was considerable uneasiness
about this agency's performance as a rate regulator and "watch-dog"
over competitive procurement." In addition to hostility toward
private monopoly, there was fear of having the image of the United
States reflected abroad by a single giant enterprise .4
Furthermore, since single-company ownership was the option
most vulnerable to charges of restricted access, those opposed to
Government ownership feared to advocate a system subject to such
strong objection. AT&T itself apparently sought to prevent the issue
from emerging as single-company ownership versus Government
ownership because the company sponsored, with other carriers and the
FCC,49 a joint venture open to all international common carriers and,
eventually, to the hardware companies and general public as well5 °
Single-company ownership, in fact, was never formally proposed in
Congress.
D. Rejection of Government Ownership
While public ownership of the space components on superficial
analysis might seem to depart radically from customary American
orbital components induces other countries to participate. Even under the present
act, foreign nations are permitted to build their own ground stations and to acquire
up to one-fifth of the corporation's voting stock held by noncarriers. Communica-
tions Satellite Act of 1962, §304(d), 76 Stat. 425, 47 U.S.C. §743(d) (Supp. IV,
1963). By now, however, eighteen nations (excluding the Soviet Union) have
actually joined with the United States to initiate the creation of an international
joint venture (61% of whose stock ComSat will hold) to establish the space com-
ponent of a global system. See U.S. State Dep't Press Release No. 346, July 28,
1964. Even the USSR has expressed interest in some sort of participation. N.Y.
Times, April 8, 1964, p. 42, col. 2 (editorial).
46 See, e.g., Statement of Sen. Wayne Morse in Hearings on Antitrust Problems
of the Space Satellite Communications System Before the Subcommittee on Anti-
trust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
74-83 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Kefauver Hearings I].
47 See, e.g., id. at 186-201 (Dr. Dallas W. Smythe, Professor).
48 See id. at 16-17 (Senator Ralph W. Yarborough).49 The Commission's eager adoption of the carriers' joint venture was criticized
as too affirmative, especially in view of its traditional passivity, and as improper
in light of its solicitation of technical and organizational advice from the very
enterprises it was supposed to be regulating and which had the greatest financial
interest in keeping out the Government. See Testimony in Sparkman Hearings
81-83; Kefauver Hearings I, at 190-99 (Smythe).
50 AT&T's strategy was probably directed in part to undercutting the claims of its
most militant congressional opponents who were seeking to keep out all carriers.
However, it may have fared better with a less conservative policy. For example,
it might have utilized its impressive technical capabilities in an attempt to present
Congress with a fait accompli in the form of a complete system of experimental
satellites.
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reliance on regulated private communications carriers, it is, in fact,
comparable to those vital public facilities used by private companies
in the transportation, atomic energy, and military R&D fields.
In transportation, at least, whenever the agencies and the "ways"
are owned separately (as in motor and air transport), the Govern-
ment normally provides the "ways," and charges for their use. In
broadcasting the airwaves are publicly owned and policed, but used
free of charge by privately-owned broadcasting stations and net-
works. Perhaps only in our public utilities (including wire com-
munication) are the distribution and production-generation facilities
in general both privately as well as jointly owned. However, even
here such ownership is not required for technical reasons as shown,
of course, by those cases where both components are publicly owned.
Even the railroads' jointly and privately-owned "ways" have been
provided at least partly through governmental aid.
In addition to the historical argument strong analytical reasons
exist for government ownership. The system is not only a "way"
needed by all ground stations, but one requiring a special, expensive
installation which the Government is financially best equipped to
provide. Furthermore, the Government is alone capable of furnishing
it without the conflicts of interest which private ownership of both
the ground stations and the "ways" might engender. Carrier owner-
ship of a space system's components can be likened to carrier owner-
ship of both motor carriers and turnpikes. Separate ownership in
the space field would at least maximize whatever possibilities for
ground-station competition may arise from the future development
of synchronous systems.
In operation a Government-owned relay might have provided
greater safeguards for equal access by users and suppliers as well as
better control of rates and greater capacity for promotional pricing.
It might have offered superior capacity to bear the losses of tech-
nologically-induced obsolescence when new systems were instituted, as
well as increased opportunity to enter into cooperative ventures with
Communist nations, especially where such ventures required long-run
subsidies. Furthermore, Government ownership could have facilitated
recovery of the Government's development "equity" while fulfilling
the system's public service responsibilities. Such ownership promised
maximum coordination of civilian and military space programs and
an end to reliance on ineffective regulation under conditions of natural
monopoly.5'
G' See Rand Memorandum RM-2925-NASA, at 120-25; United Research, Inc.,
The Commercial Application of Communications Satellites: A Study of Major
National Policy Considerations, in Hearings on H.R. 10100 Before the House Corn-
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Why, then, was Government ownership dismissed virtually from
the outset? To some extent the old "opening wedge" argument was
persuasive. Despite the contrary history of turnpikes and motor
carriers, it was feared that, "with one foot in the door," the Govern-
ment might soon intrude elsewhere in communications at home and
abroad. In addition public ownership was opposed as requiring con-
siderable in-house talent, as likely to interfere with the integration of
satellite and conventional facilities, and as liable to disrupt the flow
of private venture capital into R&D.
Furthermore, private ownership of some sort was expected to
secure needed scientific-engineering talent more rapidly than a
Government-owned system, while better facilitating the flow of venture
capital into vital R&D without disturbing the economic-regulatory
structure of the communications industry.52 Its proponents also hoped
that it would provide greater inducements to economic efficiency and
greater likelihood that the burden of development would be placed
squarely on the system's users.
53
In the final analysis, however, the rejection of a Government-
owned space relay was based in large part on crucial factual assump-
tions that remained in dispute to the very end: "
(1) Private ownership of a global relay is legally
possible and desirable notwithstanding the uncertain state of
space law and the fact that orbital objects cannot be
policed.55
(2) Private ownership is crucial for speedy development
and efficient operation even though the Government also has
the know-how and resources, and can alone provide necessary
booster and tracking capability. 6
inittee on Science aid Astronautics, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 283, 325-27 (1962) [here-
inafter cited as Miller Hearings]. The acknowledged disadvantages of Government
ownership might conceivably have been reduced by allowing private operation. Id.
at 327; Rand Memorandum RM-2925-NASA, at 125-28. After such operation
for a limited interim period, a transfer to private owners might have been feasible.
Cf. Miller Hearings 328-29. Such an arrangement might have helped to maximize
the Nation's flexibility in planning, while the presumption of eventual private owner-
ship would facilitate the flow of venture capital. Ibid. There are, of course, many
precedents for selling Government-owned facilities and know-how to private parties
after an initial developmental period.
421d. at 322-23.
53 Ibid.
54 See Pastore Hearings II, at 68-70 (Newton Minow, FCC). For provocative
testimony challenging these assumptions see Long Hearings I, at 99-110.
55Long Hearings I, at 270-72 (James E. Webb, NASA), 404-05 (Ryan);
Kefauver Hearings I, at 163 (Loevinger, Justice Dep't); Pastore Hearings II,
at 136-37 (Minow, Craven, FCC), 153-60 (Stevenson) ; Sparkman Hearings 176-77,
207-09, 217 (Dean Rusk, State Dep't), 360-64 (Morse, Lausche, Cohen); see Long
Hearings I, at 219-20 (Javits) ; Kefauver Hearings I, at 115-17 (Philip J. Farley,
State Dep't), 139 (Celler).
G6Pastore Hearings I, at 7-8, 20-21 (Minow, FCC); Kefauver Hearings I,
at 11-12 (Yarborough). But see Kefauver Hearings I, at 74-75, 81-83 (Morse).
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(3) Although satellites can accommodate far more
varied services than cable, have unique foreign policy im-
plications, and are far more expensive to install, 7 they are
essentially an adjunct of existing communications facilities 5
and thus most suitably owned and operated by the inter-
national common carriers.
59
(4) The complex international negotiations needed for
satellite communication are best handled by the common car-
riers-even though such negotiations, necessarily multi-
rather than bilateral, involve the State Department and FCC
in crucial ways.'0
(5) The great capital and operating costs of any
system, added to the need to service uneconomic markets,
virtually guarantee losses for a long time, and private com-
mon carriers rather than the Government should bear these
losses."
(6) The satellite and ground station components must
be jointly owned, even though they are technologically dis-
tinct, and common ownership would open the door to
government intrusion into both domestic and international
communication.
In regard to this last point, it is ironical that those who urged
exclusive joint ownership of the satellites and the stations 6 may
inadvertently have intensified the opposition to Government ownership
of either component, whereas those who proposed separate ownership
57 Long Hearings I, at 204-05, 208 (Busignies) ; Pastore Hearings II, at 237-38
(Beirne), cf. Pastore Hearings II, at 151-52 (McGhee); Kefauver Hearings II,
at 387-89 (Sarnoff). Contra, Kefauver Hearings I, at 81 (Morse).
58 Hearings on H.R. 10115 and H.R. 10138 Before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 402 (Minow)
[hereinafter cited as Harris Hearings II]; Kerr Hearings 197-297 (Minow) ; Long
Hearings I, at 204-05, 208 (Busignies) ; Kefauver Hearings I, at 81 (Morse), 387-89
(Sarnoff, RCA) ; Pastore Hearings II, at 151-52, 160-65 (McGhee), 237-38 (Beirne).
69 Kerr Hearings 197-98 (Minow).
6OHarris Hearings II, at 403 (Minow); Kerr Hearings 198-99 (Minow);
Pastore Hearings II, at 160-65 (McGhee); Kefauver Hearings I, at 299-302 (Minow,
Craven).
61 Harris Hearings II, at 403 (Minow); Kerr Hearings 199 (Minow); Long
Hearings I, at 473-74 (Craven) ; Hearings Before House Committee on Science and
Astronautics, ser. 2, at 326-29 (Dingman) ; see id. at 59-61 (Engstrom); cf. id. at
414-15 (Leonard E. Root, Lockheed); Kefauver Hearings I, at 118-19 (Farley).
See also Harris Hearings II, at 507-09 (Busignies).
62joint ownership of both components was explicitly proposed in Kefauver
Hearings II, at 446-47, 450-52 (Barr); Pastore Hearings II, at 281-84 (Barr).
Consideration was also given to eventual joint ownership of the whole global system
under the United Nations. See Memorandum of Professor Leon Lipson, in
Pastore Hearings II, at 302, 304.
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of the two components 6 3 may actually have made the case for Govern-
ment ownership of the satellites more palatable."
All these factors underlie the rejection of Government enterprise
in favor of a regulated joint venture. Absent such considerations, the
organizational decision might also have been different. Because
Congress' choice was influenced by highly emotional, oft-unsupported
claims and counterclaims, ComSat's statutory responsibilities demand
the most careful employment of management's discretionary power.
Discretion must be exercised well within the broad limits set by ex-
ternal and internal constraints. ComSat officials must constantly
remain aware that their organizational arrangements are more a
compromise with existing power realities than any ideal mechanism
guaranteeing "automatic" fulfillment of the act's directives.
E. The Debate Over Joint Ventures
The remaining option, the joint venture, was available in three
basic types: narrow-based, broad-based, and exclusionary, i.e., exclud-
ing all carriers and hardware companies. On economic grounds the
narrow-based venture offered considerable advantage. Adminis-
tratively it was by general agreement more manageable than a broad-
based venture. Like the broad-based, but unlike the exclusionary
venture, the narrow-based joint venture was able to spread the cost
of a satellite system among domestic as well as international messages.
If the present domestic carriers had been excluded, and therefore
satellite costs could not directly be apportioned to domestic users,
the consequent burden on international users alone might have priced
the system beyond market demand for a long time.
The choice of a broad-based over a narrow consortium, like the
dismissal of a Government-owned system, was largely motivated by
socio-political considerations. Congress preferred the possibly slower-
growing broad venture to a narrow-based undertaking which seemed
more likely to impede "wide diffusion." The exclusionary venture,
63 Proposals for separate ownership of satellites and stations took several forms.
One proposal called for safeguarding the corporation's rights to control its own
stations in the face of pressures for exclusive ownership by the carriers. See
Pastore Hearings II, at 30-31 (Dr. Edward C. Welsh, Natl Aeronautics and Space
Council), 51-53 (Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, justice Dep't), 289-91 (Edward R.
Murrow, USIA). A second suggestion would have protected the carriers' rights
to own stations, in addition to the corporation's rights. See Harris Hearings II,
at 669-71 (Engstrom) ; Pastore Hearings II, at 63-64 (Minow). A third approach
would have excluded the corporation completely by limiting ground station owner-
ship to the common carriers. See Pastore Hearings II, at 180-83 (Dingman). A
modification of this approach would have the carriers own "at least" the stations,
though if possible the satellite segment also. See note 37 supra.
6 4 At one point RCA explicitly alluded to such an arrangement. See Brooks
Hearings 59, 67 (Engstrom).
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however, was rejected because its development was likely to be
considerably slower than that of the broad-based venture. This
consideration outweighed the exclusionary undertaking's potentially
lessened restraints on trade and possibility of greater diffusion. 5
The remedy which Congress finally selected was thus obviously
not commission regulation pure and simple. It was in fact a set of
special techniques intended to produce, by internal organizational
constraints, some of the results that a competitive economic structure
would have produced externally. In section III we will examine these
safeguards and the competitive principles which they sought to impose
on ComSat's behavior as buyer of hardware and R&D and as seller
of channel capacity to the common carriers.
66
III. THE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION
ComSat can be distinguished from joint ventures in other fields
both by the ingenuity of its internal antitrust-regulatory safeguards,
and by the greater range and specificity of the goals it is supposed to
further and which can be cited to exonerate any restrictive behavior.
Any evaluation of ComSat must therefore involve a consideration
of these elaborate mechanisms and of their probable ability, as con-
trasted with the options rejected by Congress, to prevent ComSat
from: (1) eliminating potential competition in international com-
munications; (2) foreclosing access to its facilities by potential users
or suppliers who do not hold stock; (3) retarding technological
progress in space communication to preserve the capital value of the
co-owners' investments elsewhere; (4) falling under one-company
control; (5) imposing excessive or discriminatory charges on its
customers, or shifting onto them the charges which the corporation
65 The classic case for a consortium of carriers appears in Response of AT&T,
Inquiry Into Administrative and Regulatory Problems of Commercially Operable Space
Communications Systems, No. 14024, FCC, March 29, 1961, in Brooks Hearings
337, 339-45; Reply of AT&T, pp. 376-86, Inquiry Into Administrative and Regulatory
Problems, supra; Report of the Ad Hoc Carrier Committee, Inquiry Into Adminis-
trative and Regulatory Problems, supra, in Pastore Hearings I, at 203-69. Early
versions of a broad-based venture open to hardware-aerospace as well as carrier
interests are in Response of General Electric Co., in Brooks Hearings 148, 166-68,
and Comments of Lockheed Aircraft Corp., id. at 410-17. A joint venture from
which all carriers were excluded, to avoid conflicts of interest, was considered at
length in Long Hearings II, at 550-58, 611-13, 628-33, 649-51. The more extreme
version of a venture from which aerospace-hardware interests, as well as the car-
riers, would be excluded is mentioned in Long Hearings I, at 90-92 (Leland Johnson,
Rand Corp.).
66 These competitive principles are well stated. Id. at 25-28 (Loevinger) ; Harris
Hearings I, at 131 (Loevinger). On the creation of internal structural arrange-
ments to supplement the external constraints, see Kefauver Hearings I, at 146-50
(Loevinger).
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES
should be paying to the Government for access to space know-how
and facilities."7
A. Elimination of Potential Competition
Creation of the Communications Satellite Corporation will harm
potential competition only if it discourages or prevents: (1) indi-
vidual carriers or equipment manufacturers from building their own
satellite systems; (2) the formation of joint ventures by newcomers
unaffiliated with these interests; (3) competition between the major
common carrier or hardware stockholders in business outside the
venture, or competition between these companies and the joint venture
itself.
The first eventuality is unlikely. Had a joint venture not been
authorized, to be sure, either AT&T or the Government could have
acted alone, or separate companies could have built different segments
of a single global system. Therefore, it cannot be said that "but for
the joint venture, no entry would take place." But the Communica-
tions Satellite Act did not itself preclude the development of a set
of competing satellite systems. The technical factors which prevented
such competition-capital costs, spectrum scarcity, channel capacity-
have already been reviewed."8
Second, the act itself does not discourage ventures by newcomers.
True, if existing aerospace-communications companies had been ex-
cluded from owning stock in any joint satellite venture, and if speed
had been no concern, a facility might eventually have been established
by newcomers with no ties in these fields. Such a venture might have
better subjected the older cable-radio interests to vigorous competition
than does a venture run by enterprises with heavy investments in these
conventional fields.69 But the aerospace-communications companies
were the most likely sources of know-how and resources, and speed
was a desideratum.
6 7 Collusion among participants outside of a joint venture and the preservation
of capital values elsewhere-points comparable to (1) and (4)-are frequently
mentioned as potential dangers of joint ventures. BREWsTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERI-
CAN BUSINESS ABROAD 202-06 (1958). Points comparable to (2) and (3)-
discrimination in access among users and suppliers-are often raised where a joint
venture provides a unique facility. KAYsEN & TURNER, op. cit. supra note 23, at 137.
Point (4)-single-company control-is closely intertwined with the first three, and
point (5) relates to joint ventures in any field where Government has provided
valuable overhead capital and where, on this count, it seeks to recover an equity.
68 See pp. 326-32 supra.
69 The rates of an independent system originally might have been higher than
those of a system whose rate base also included domestic communications facilities.
But when fully utilized, the independent relay's charges might well be lower and
competitive pressures on the older radio-cable services correspondingly greater.
1965]
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The passage of time would clearly have increased the possibility
that some of ComSat's stockholders, if prevented from participating in
a joint venture, might have established their own separate systems.
Newcomers also would have been more likely to do so eventually if all
carriers and hardware companies had been excluded. Development
of additional systems was dependent on the possibility that new
markets and new technology might one day ease spectrum scarcities,
reduce the costs of ground stations and orbital components, while
improving launch success and satellite reliability.7" In this remote
sense, therefore, the Satellite Act may have dimmed the incentive for
independent action by carriers. Legislation which excluded all carriers
and hardware companies might have encouraged newcomers to create
their own systems. But foreclosure of this possibility is far from an
elimination of present or potential competition in any immediate or
tangible sense.
A Government-owned system is the only certain alternative whose
development the act precluded, at least in the United States.7 1 Such
a system might have developed quickly and subjected the older cable
and radio systems to new competition. Antitrust, however, is not
concerned with the elimination of federal-government competition, any
more than it considers any deterrent effects of ComSat on the
common-market countries.
Third, the major restrictive danger that remains, therefore, is
that the rival carriers and equipment manufacturers who participate
in ComSat may not go their own way afterwards; that cooperating
closely on a daily basis, they may be tempted also to do so in their
outside business by market-sharing and price-fixing; that ComSat may
70 Similar issues were raised in United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
Grace and Pan American had jointly created Panagra on the understanding that
the new line would not compete with the latter on the east coast of South America.
The cost of establishing airports and other facilities and negotiating with the local
governments was allegedly too great for either company alone at that time. The
creation of Panagra, subject to the restrictive territorial agreement, clearly deterred
potential future competition between Pan American and Panagra and possibly also
between Grace and Pan American. Such deterrence can be conceptualized then as
the "price" paid to establish Panagra earlier than otherwise. The communications
satellite situation poses similar issues even after allowance is made for the longer
time period before changing demand and cost conditions would facilitate establish-
ment of a system by newcomers to communications.
71 The act, however, does explicitly permit the Government to create its own
system to handle "unique governmental needs." Communications Satellite Act of
1962, §§102(d), 201(a)(b), 76 Stat. 419, 421, 47 U.S.C. §§701(d), 721(a)(6)
(Supp. IV, 1963). The Government is apparently expected to use the commercial
system for all other matters, whatever its cost, and regardless of whether it might
sometimes be more economical to use under-utilized military or meteorological systems.
On the need for a special amendment to correct this situation, see Hearings Before
Senate Foreign Relations Committee 203-05 (Morse, Rusk), 282-84 (Morse,
Dryden), 301-07 (McNamara) ; cf. id. at 233 (Morse, Morrow).
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be kept from competing vigorously with firms which participate as
co-owners and whose representatives serve as its directors.
Although sui generis in many ways, ComSat at least superficially
resembles the very kind of joint venture which, in the absence of
explicit legislative sanction, would probably be termed presumptively
unlawful." Both ComSat and its major stockholders-the common
carriers-will sell in the same market where both possess substantial
market power. The carrier stockholders will not only be rivals outside
the venture, but also produce services within it that are vertically
related to those of other probable co-owners (the equipment manu-
facturers). Such conditions often nurture anticompetitive practices. 3
It is by no means self-evident, however, as frequently asserted,
that the Satellite Act will "exempt" ComSat's major stockholders from
the antitrust laws-even in their satellite activities. 4  The act ex-
plicitly subjects ComSat to the federal antitrust laws and empowers
the Attorney General to take it to court for cause.75  Nonetheless, an
"exemption theory," taking a more subtle form, might run as
follows:
(1) A joint venture limited to the carriers alone,
because of its marked anticompetitive inclination, would be
challenged under the antitrust laws, notwithstanding the
FCC's jurisdiction.
(2) To mitigate antitrust objections, as well as for
other reasons, Congress broadened ComSat's ownership base,
and imposed explicit national policy commitments on the
co-owners, presumably even at the expense of profits.
(3) The furtherance of these national goals " can
fairly be cited to justify restraints which arise even in a
broad-based venture.
(4) Restraints which might otherwise be illegal are
thus acceptable as ancillary to the legitimate pursuit of the
act's explicit goals.
72 See KAYSEN & TURNER, op. cit. sipra note 23, at 138-39.
73For example, the price-output decisions of the joint venturers may become
overly interrelated. The partners may reduce their competition with each other
outside because joint participation in management, investment, and internal pricing,
by enhancing their knowledge of one another, may prevent any partner from altering
his market share without precipitating immediate retaliation. Power in one market
may be used to foreclose vertical access in another, with price-output decisions
coordinated to the detriment of nonparticipants. See BRiVsER, op. cit. supra note
67, at 202-05; KAYSEN & TURNER, op. cit. spra note 23, at 138-39.
74 See Kefauver Hearings I, at 2-3 (Kefauver), 58-62 (Katzenbach), 142-49,
160-61 (Loevinger) ; Kefauver Hearings II, at 346-48 (Celler) ; Pastore Hearings II,
at 55-56 (Kefauver), 347 (Katzenbach).
75 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, §§ 102(c), 403(a), 76 Stat. 419, 426,
47 U.S.C. §§ 701(c), 743(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
76 See Communications Satellite Act of 1962, § 102, 76 Stat. 419, 47 U.S.C.
§ 701 (Supp. IV, 1963).
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A claim of "exemption" here is clearly a sloganized challenge
to the effectiveness of ComSat's internal safeguards and the explicitness
of its national responsibilities. As such, however, it may unwittingly
perform a useful function of its own. Since ComSat's principal
justification lies in its internal arrangements designed to forestall trade
restraints and promote specific national goals more effectively than
other viable options, close public scrutiny of both areas can have only
a salutary effect. Whether ComSat's co-owners will in fact "get off"
easier than other joint venturers (and thus be "exempted") should
the internal safeguards not work will depend on whether the courts
grant wider latitude to joint venturers who pursue explicit statutory
goals than to those who can justify their actions only by reference to
private business purposes."
B. Discrimination Among Potential Users
A joint venture by nature poses a considerable danger of dis-
crimination in access in favor of participants in the venture. As an
antitrust matter, such foreclosure runs counter to the prescriptions of
equitable, nondiscriminatory treatment found in the landmark cases
of United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n7 and Associated Press v.
United States.79
In Terminal, where the outsiders could neither create a com-
parable facility nor survive without one, the Court made equal access
by all potential users mandatory.80 In organizing the satellite system
Congress appears to have imposed a similar legislative requirement
on ComSat.
The Associated Press, in contrast, was not required to admit
outsiders, but was merely prohibited from discriminating in new
admissions against the rivals of existing members." The "indis-
pensability" of Associated Press' service, based on the inferiority of
77 Of course regulatory goals could also be cited to exonerate the restrictive
conduct of a common-carrier consortium or a venture of newcomers. ComSat's
elaborate internal safeguards, however, are a unique effort to offset the anticompetitive
tendencies inherent in regulation. For alternative theses on the manner in which
regulation comes to subordinate competitive to regulatory noims, see Jaffe, The
Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARv. L. REV.
1105 (1954) ; Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries:
An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. REv. 436 (1954).
78224 U.S. 383 (1912).
79 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
SOUnited States v. Terminal R-R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 411 (1911).
81 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21 (1945).
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possible substitute services, suggests a further analogy with the
satellite case insofar as: (1) those excluded from a joint satellite
venture can in theory use high-frequency radio or submarine cable;
but (2) the former is already in many uses a poor substitute for
cable, not to mention a satellite link; and (3) submarine cable is as
yet unable to accommodate the full variety and volume of service which
an operating satellite system will supposedly be able to handle by
19702
Complete exclusion of all nonowners is thus clearly indefensible
under Terminal and Associated Press. A more likely occurrence is
foreclosed access through preferential treatment of owners when
channel demand exceeds supply. In view of likely underutilization in
the near future, this danger is not immediate. Its future seriousness
will depend on the actual divergence between supply of, and demand
for, channel capacity, as well as the degree to which channels are
leased without full authority to use them interchangeably for various
communication media such as telephone, data transmission, and the
like.'
A more imminent peril is rate discrimination, e.g., charging
major co-owners less for channel usage than nonowners who seek direct
access for competitive services. Possible safeguards here include
sophisticated accounting checks on internal pricing arrangements and
a prescription of uniform rates for all major users of the facility,
whether or not they share in ownership34
C. Discrimination Among Potential Suppliers
Competitive imbalance is clearly possible if some, but not all,
hardware companies hold stock in a joint venture directly or in-
directly through their common-carrier parents. Although such im-
balance is not impossible under the present act, its occurrence is less
likely than under a common-carrier consortium or under single-
company ownership.
8 2 in addition to antitrust precedent, a final justification for equal access
is found in the equity which the Government may claim in the satellite system
through its provision of essential social-overhead capital. Unencumbered access for
users and potential suppliers promotes a wide diffusion of benefits.
83 Projections of demand and supply, see pp. 331-32 srupra, suggest that under-
utilization will continue for years, even on routes with the densest traffic. Further-
more, there are at present no valid economic or engineering reasons for ComSat to
designate specific channel uses. At some future point, however, when demand
exceeds supply at the regulated price rate then prevailing, ComSat may be forced
to ration its channels according to nonprice criteria, thus permitting discrimination
in favor of stockholders.
4Even uniform rates may be discriminatory as a result of underlying dif-
ferences in the cost and demand conditions of different markets. See pp. 352-53 infra.
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The present possibility for such discrimination arises from the
factual context of ComSat. The major carriers are participating as
owners. Most of them, as well as many other actual or prospective
investors, have important equipment-manufacturing ties, usually sub-
sidiaries or affiliates, which they would ordinarily favor.8 5 If so
inclined and not specially prevented, ComSat might indulge in such
favoritism by shaping model design to favor the capabilities of par-
ticular hardware companies. Manufacturers represented on ComSat's
board and privy to its long-range plans would have a decisive ad-
vantage in winning additional contracts even if the FCC, despite its
lack of expertise in this area, is more successful than expected in
enforcing competitive bidding. Indeed, any hardware company which
has worked for NASA or ComSat would, on that count alone,
probably have gained crucial experience and knowledge advantageous
for winning continued contractual support.86
The only special safeguard the proposed common-carrier con-
sortium proposed in this area was the prescription that the FCC
maintain competition in the procurement of hardware and R&D.
ComSat's broad ownership base, on the other hand, was expected to
strengthen such additional checks on monopolistic domination of fore-
closed access as government directors, FCC policing, carrier good-will,
or the direct application of antitrust laws. Congress rejected pro-
posed safeguards against restrictive patent practices by ComSat
stockholders who patent inventions emerging from Government space
contracts.8 7 Nonetheless, general Government policies toward such
patents do provide some protection. s
85 Harris Hearings II, at 688-89 (Ryan); Kefauver Hearings I, at 145-46
(Loevinger); Kefauver Hearings II, at 357-59 (Long); Pastore Hearings II, at
56 (Kefauver). ComSat's four major carrier stockholders, each with hardware
ties and capabilities for R&D, include AT&T (with 29% of total common stock
outstanding), IT&T (10.5%), General Telephone & Electronics (3.5%), and RCA
Communications (2.5%). See Prospectus of the Communications Satellite Cor-
poration, June 2, 1964, p. 7.
86To date, for example, ComSat has contracted with AT&T, RCA, Space
Technology Laboratories, Inc. (in association with IT&T), and with Hughes Air-
craft Corporation for work on a variety of satellite hardware, and again with AT&T
for the use of its Andover terminal station. Prospectus of the Communications
Satellite Corporation, June 2, 1964, pp. 15-16; see Notice of First Annual Meeting
of Shareholders of the Communications Satellite Corporation, Aug. 13, 1964, p. 4;
Communications Satellite Corporation, First Report to Shareholders, Aug. 3, 1964,
pp. 9-11. ComSat appears to be well aware of the delicacy of such arrangements.
See First Report of ComSat Pursuant to Section 404(b) of the Communications
Satellite Act, Jan. 31, 1964, p. 4; By-Laws of the Communications Satellite Cor-
poration, May 18, 1964, art. 4.02.
87 See 108 CONG. REc. 16822-28 (1962) (remarks of Senator Morse).
88The Government retains patents on all inventions resulting from NASA-
financed research or, in cases where patent rights are waived, may retain a non-
exclusive, royalty-free license with unlimited right to sublicense without payment.
See National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, §§ 203(a), (f), (g), 72
Stat. 429, 435, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2457(a), (f), (g), 2473(a) (1958) ; Hearings on NASA
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Several questions remain unresolved. Is the general application
of the antitrust laws to ComSat meaningful without specific applica-
tion of specific provisions? Will the ownership participation of some
but not all hardware manufacturers impede nonparticipants in selling
to the corporation under fair conditions? Will the FCC subject to
special scrutiny corporate actions which the Government directors
disapprove? Can any private system avoid the transfer of the
industry's external structure into the area of intracorporate bargaining?
Finally there remains the danger that the carrier stockholders will
seek favored treatment for their equipment subsidiaries even at in-
flated hardware prices. Although the carriers might then be forced
to pay a higher price for use of corporation facilities, these payments
could be passed on to the ultimate consumer as higher rates. The
carriers' unregulated hardware affiliates would still benefit from pre-
mium earnings.
D. Retardation of Technological Progress
The extensive hardware and communications interests of most
major prospective stockholders are an unavoidable consequence of the
attempt to secure private ownership together with speedy development.
A widely-feared but not inevitable concomitant would be an attempt
by the joint venturers to retard new innovations which might threaten
their older capital investments.
AT&T, for example, is deeply committed to low-orbiting random
systems and to the continued development of cable technology.89 At
the same time its large equity, technological know-how, and possible
initial loans to ComSat guarantee it considerable power in the satellite
corporation, especially since other carrier stockholders are also de-
pendent on it for access to transoceanic cables vital to their other
business interests. AT&T, furthermore, by diverting its own business
from satellite to cable facilities, could keep ComSat's rates unfavorably
high relative to substitutes, thus reducing utilization of the satellite
system.90 AT&T's satellite stockholdings might deter such diversion,
Authorization for Fiscal Year 1964 Before Senate Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1, at 237 (1963) ; cf. id. at 238. See also
Kefauver Hearings II, at 586-87 (cooperative agreement between NASA and
AT&T); Barber, Econonic and Legal Problems of Government Patent Policies, in
Hearings on the Impact of Government Patent Policies Before the Monopoly Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on Small Business, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 47-74
(1963) (critique of proposed changes in NASA's patent policies).
89 See Miller Hearings 136-20 (Dingman). See also Rand Memorandum RM-
3877-NASA, at 2-8 (implications of AT&T's projected 720 circuit cable).
9OKefauver Hearings I, at 14-15 (Yarborough), 177 (Ryan). In fairness to
AT&T, by no means all public statements of all its rivals reveal undue alarm over
the danger of single-company domination, given appropriate safeguards. See
19651
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depending oh AT&T's valuation of ComSat losses as against the gains
expected from keeping its own cable facilities fully utilized. ComSat
losses also might be more easily sustained if the satellite system's policies
could be influenced to the advantage of a stockholder's outside interests.
If the act's regulatory safeguards can effectively curb the dangers
of single-company domination, technological retardation will be less
likely. The crucial question appears to be whether AT&T's great
power can be adequately controlled by the fifteen directors, of whom
no more than three may be selected, directly or indirectly, by AT&T."'
Will the noncarrier directors' desires for profits negate the carriers'
interest in preserving old capital values? Or will the large hardware
companies prefer to cooperate in retarding technical innovation in
return for procurement decisions which favor them at the expense
of nonparticipating manufacturers? The answers to questions like
these will determine whether ComSat will sacrifice the national interest
in a high-altitude system in an attempt to maintain the value of an
earlier investment in a random system. 2
The act does, in fact, provide several safeguards to cope with
these problems. It limits each common carrier to direct or indirect
votes for no more than three of the six common carrier directors.93
Six other directors are to be chosen by the public stockholders (in-
cluding the noncarrier hardware interests), and three by the President.
Furthermore, the carriers' share of total stock outstanding is limited
to fifty percent; individual holdings by noncarriers, to not more than
ten percent of the whole; foreign interests, to no more than twenty
percent." However, it has been argued that AT&T could still
dominate through stock manipulation 5 or, as noted above, by divert-
Kefauver Hearings II, at 397-98 (Sarnoff), 433-34, 438-39 (Puckett, Hughes).
AT&T has in fact announced plans to meet its future trans-Atlantic needs by
satellites rather than additional cables. N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1963, p. 22, col. 1;
Prospectus of Communications Satellite Corporation, June 2, 1964, p. 27.
91 See text accompanying notes 93-107 infra.
92 Domination through majority vote control presents no serious problem. Even
in a narrow-based consortium each carrier can be represented equally on the board
of directors, without regard to its equity shares. Domination through majority
stockholdings can be curbed even more readily in a broad-based venture where the
share of capital subscribed by any single stockholder can be more easily limited.
The domination that results from predominant usage is more difficult to control.
It is doubtful whether anything short of access to a second system would be
effective, for the power relationships outside the venture might simply be repro-
duced in the bargains struck inside.
93Communications Satellite Act of 1962, §303(a), 76 Stat. 423, 47 U.S.C.
§ 733(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
94 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, §§304(b), (d), 76 Stat. 424-25, 47
U.S.C. §§ 734(b), (d) (Supp. IV, 1963).
95 If AT&T should provide some 80% of satellite use, for example, it could
theoretically purchase 80% of the voting stock reserved for all carriers. Although
this would permit her to elect only three directors, the company might achieve
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ing its demand from satellite to cable or radio facilities. Unrestricted
ownership would reduce this danger by widening the sources of
venture capital. As the number of owners increases, however, so
does the opportunity for one of them to dominate with a small per-
centage of stock.
Moreover, by widening the categories of eligible participants and
setting a ceiling of $100 per share on the initial price of stock, the
act sought further to prevent excessive dependence for capital on any
single entity. The possibility remains, however, that subsequent issues
will be sold at far higher prices, with a resultant bunching of stock-
holdings. Much will depend here on management's discretion. Note-
worthy in this regard are the careful, apparently successful efforts of
ComSat's interim board to secure the widest initial distribution of
common stock, 6 and the recent election of six of its members as the
organization's public directors-men presumably committed to this
low-price, wide-distribution policy."
Other safeguards are provided to assure an optimal rate of
technological progress. Thus the FCC must approve the technical
characteristics of any system's components and insure their com-
patibility with each other and with conventional communications
facilities." The act also gives NASA an advisory function in evaluat-
dominance by colluding successfully with another carrier and an equipment manu-
facturer or, conceivably, with two equipment manufacturers. Numerous other
strategies are also possible. Kefauver Hearings I, at 160-61. Such dangers may
have been exaggerated during the legislative proceedings. See note 96 infra
(ComSat's special safeguards to guarantee wide stock distribution). The possibility
remains, nonetheless, that internal collusion among the major stockholders will be
no easier to check (or any less likely to occur) than collusion among the com-
panies outside.
9 0 In accordance with § 302, ComSat's fourteen presidentially-appointed incor-
porators served as its interim board of directors. To facilitate the widest initial stock
distribution, this Board set the opening stock price at $20, and imposed a 1%o ceiling
on the percentage of all stock which any noncarrier could hold, in both cases figures
well below the statutory maxima. Further, it reduced AT&T's stockholdings accord-
ing to an FCC stock-allocation formula to be applied if the shares reserved for all
common carriers were oversubscribed. Finally, the board sought to provide the kind
of information needed by innumerable prospective shareholders, inexperienced as in-
vestors, who were believed likely as a group to underestimate the risks involved.
See Prospectus of Communications Satellite Corporation, June 2, 1964, pp. 4-6
(risks), 26-28 (competition), 7, 52-53 (carrier subscription matters); First Report
of ComSat Pursuant to Section 404(b) of the Communications Satellite Act, Jan. 31,
1964, pp. 11-12. The distribution of public (noncarrier) shares is indicated generally
in Communications Satellite Corporation, First Report to Shareholders, Aug. 3,
1964, pp. 14-15.
97 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1964, pp. 45, 52, col. 1.
98 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, §§ 201(c) (4), (6), 76 Stat. 421, 47
U.S.C. §§ 721() (4), (6) (Supp. IV, 1963). In addition § 214(d) of the Com-
munications Act of 1934, 57 Stat 12 (1943), 47 U.S.C. § 214(d) (1958), empowers
the FCC to require or to disapprove extensions or modifications of communications
equipment by common carriers. The act presumably applies to a satellite relay. See
Kefauver Hearings II, at 304-05 (Minow).
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ing these characteristics.9 9 It allows the President a general super-
visory and coordinating function,""0 and gives to the FCC power to
authorize the construction and operation of all terminal stations.''
NASA also has the power to provide experimental booster and track-
ing facilities contingent upon a showing that an experiment will
significantly further space know-how and technology.'
However, even these provisions are not entirely free of problems.
The act requires NASA to provide all boosters needed to maintain
any existing satellite system once the system has been approved by
the FCC. 3 Conceivably, therefore, under FCC approval NASA
may have to service a system to which it would never have granted
its facilities at the outset under section 201 (b) (3).'04 Thus, under
section 201 (c) (6), even against NASA's advice under section
201(b) (1), the FCC could approve the technical characteristics of
the operational satellite system to be employed by the corporation.0 "
Furthermore, the FCC has never deprived any common carrier or
broadcaster of its license in order to force the institution of superior
technical standards." 6 If licenses clearly designated as temporary are
rarely taken back, how likely is the Commission to withdraw ap-
proval where hundreds of millions of dollars have been invested? 107
99 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, §§201(b) (1), (4), 76 Stat. 421, 47
U.S.C. §§ 721(b) (1), (4) (Supp. IV, 1963).
100 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, §201(a), 76 Stat. 421, 47 U.S.C.
§721(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
101 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, § 201(c) (7), 76 Stat. 421, 47 U.S.C.
§721(c) (7) (Supp. IV, 1963).
102 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, § 201(b) (3), 76 Stat. 421, 47 U.S.C.
§721(b) (3) (Supp. IV, 1963).
103 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, § 201(b) (5), 76 Stat. 421, 47 U.S.C.
§721(b) (5) (Supp. IV, 1963).
104Communications Satellite Act of 1962, § 201(b) (3), 76 Stat. 421, 47 U.S.C.
§721(b) (3) (Supp. IV, 1963), requires that NASA furnish launchings and asso-
ciated services that the administration feels are necessary for the development of
the system.
0 5 Ambiguities in jurisdictional areas among the governmental bodies regulating
ComSat are serious. See Rosenblum, Regulation in Orbit: Administrative Aspects
of the Communications Act of 1962, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 216, 233-34 (1963).
106 Of course, the Commission's power to prescribe depredation rates would
obviously influence rates of innovation. Kefauver Hearings II, at 304-06 (Hyde,
Strassburg, Minow, FCC).
107The FCC has argued that the international character of the system will
determine its rate of innovation. For example, the heavy cable investments of AT&T
may be outweighed by those of the British Post Office. Moreover, new techniques
are often introduced gradually, thus avoiding any dramatic obsolescence. See
Kefauver Hearings II, at 298-307. Unlike short-lived satellite equipment, however,
ground-station hardware is long-lived. Control of the stations (the bulk of invest-
ment capital) will clearly influence the kind of orbital components used. Retardation
on the American side remains a danger, notwithstanding the international scope
of the enterprise. Beyond the act's formal safeguards, however, there remain two
ultimate constraints: the possibility that foreign governments may withdraw to create
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One final complication must be mentioned. An apparent retarda-
tion of technological progress may be explained as an attempt to
diversify communications techniques to protect against future un-
certainties. Carrier spokesmen and some regulatory officials see
submarine cable, high-frequency radio, tropospheric scatter, high
and low-altitude satellites, all as important supplements (not substi-
tutes) in the event of military disaster or the vagaries of nature.03
Hence inclusion of satellite investment in the common-carrier rate
base is said to be doubly attractive-it facilitates internal subsidization
of service to underdeveloped countries and of additional "outmoded"
cable and radio facilities in time of national crisis. These national
objectives are said to justify higher rates than would eventually be
charged if the satellite service were priced exclusively on its own
rate base. Even if we grant, arguendo, the importance of these goals,
however, it is by no means clear that internal subsidization will
achieve them more efficiently than an overt subsidy.
E. Pricing Policy
The special characteristics of a satellite relay aggravate the
traditional regulatory problem of reconciling fairness in pricing with
economic efficiency. The statutory responsibilities imposed on ComSat
include nondiscriminatory access to its facilities and the widest dif-
fusion of its benefits. There are further commitments to service un-
profitable markets in the developing nations and to the early establish-
ment of a global system. 9 Political pressures on an American-
dominated system may compel ComSat to service poorer countries
long before their internal communications systems justify such service.
In other ways, too, considerations of fairness could clash seriously
with functional efficiency. Finally, ComSat may be pressed to offer
preferential prices to the Government and to pay the full costs of
NASA's booster-tracking facilities, including some contribution to
allocated overhead.
1. Alternative Pricing Principles
Efficiency requires that common carriers be permitted to rent
channels from ComSat so long as the price they pay exceeds the cost
of providing them. Where joint costs are substantial, however, and
their own systems, or that they would press for internationalization. See Rand
Memorandum RM-3484-RC, at 78; N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1964, p. 31, cols. 1-2; id.,
Nov. 13, 1963, p. 17, cols. 1-2. See generally Rand Memorandum RM-3484-RC, at
77-81.
1o8 Pastore Hearings II, at 173-75 (Dingman).
109 Pp. 322-23 opra.
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average total costs decline, a price that covers short-run, or even
long-run, incremental cost may not yield revenues adequate to cover
the system's total costs. This statement must be explained.
"Joint costs" refer to the unavoidable expenditures for developing,
building, launching, tracking, and replacing the orbital satellites re-
quired for any and all pairs of ground stations. Such costs are
"joint" in that several links can be provided by a single capital outlay,
and because the elimination of service on one link, at least in a random
system, will not increase the capacity of another."' "Incremental
costs" are costs incurred solely to open another communications link
between any existing pair of ground stations, largely through modi-
fication of equipment. More precisely, the incremental cost of ex-
panding service in a random orbiting system is the added cost of
equipping any pair of ground stations to communicate with each other
as well as with other stations to which they are already linked. In
a stationary satellite system incremental costs will also include the
foregone returns that the channels could have earned in their best
alternative use,'" so-called opportunity costs of using the link rather
than permitting its use by stations located on some other link.
Preliminary studies indicate that average total costs per voice
channel will tend to decline indefinitely as the system's capacity rises."12
Thus the cost of launching and using satellites will probably increase
with rising channel capacity, but less than proportionately. Likewise,
a relatively small increase in cost may be expected to yield a fairly
substantial increase in the voice channel capacity of any ground station.
Once a station is established, relatively minor, inexpensive modifica-
tions of equipment will enable it to communicate with additional
points.
11o The closing of any link in a random-orbiting system will release no addi-
tional channel capacity for any other link because each satellite is used by different
stations at different times. In a stationary system several pairs of stations can use
each satellite simultaneously and, thus, must compete for channels. Joint costs in
such a system are therefore more properly calculated as total costs minus the
incremental costs incurred to equip any ground station to communicate with any other
less the cost of bidding any channels away from their best alternative use when
peak demands for them by different stations coincide. See generally Johnson, Joint
Cost and Price Discrimination, 37 J. Business 34-37 (1964). This section of the
Article uses as a point of departure Johnson's illuminating analysis and the supporting
Rand Corporation documents on which he draws.
"l In a random orbiting system these opportunity costs are always zero because
the satellites will rarely be within simultaneous line of sight of a sufficient number
of ground stations to account for all available channels. Hence the channels will be
usable by relatively few stations at any time. In a stationary system, on the other
hand, many stations may compete simultaneously for access to any given channel.
However, the cost of bidding a channel away from some alternative user will be
low unless the peak demands of different pairs of stations for the same channel
coincide. Time differences and language barriers make this unlikely. See id. at 37.
See generally id. at 34-37.
112 Rand Memorandum RM-3487-RC, at 39-50.
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ComSat's joint costs could be allocated in a variety of ways,
each striking a somewhat different balance between the regulatory
requirements of equity and efficiency. They could be: (1) covered in
full by a Government subsidy, with prices on each link meeting only
long or short-run incremental costs; (2) distributed according to the
user's ability to pay; (3) priced to diffuse benefits widely; (4) shared
equally among all participating ground stations; (5) apportioned
according to the relative size of incremental costs on each line; (6)
allocated according to the elasticity of demand for channels on the
several links."1 '
(1) Incremental-cost pricing with Government subsidy is prob-
ably the soundest option in this case although the one least likely to
be used. Economic efficiency dictates that public utility customers
be served wherever they are willing to pay at least the added cost
of providing service." 4 Governmental subsidization of the resulting
deficit is justified further by the wide potential benefits of such service.
In the case of satellites, moreover, the subsidy can be drawn widely
from among all participating nations on an ability-to-pay basis, thus
enhancing the service's appeal to the poorer nations, and largely
reconciling, on a pragmatic basis, fairness and functional efficiency.
Indeed this last advantage may well constitute the most persuasive
argument of all.
Ironically, however, there are drastic practical impediments to any
such combination of incremental-cost pricing and Government subsidy.
The long, stormy debate over Government ownership of the satellite
system resulted in Congress' strong, final commitment to "self-
sustaining" private ownership. The heated accusations of Government
"giveaway," and the loose counterclaims that a private corporation
would save the taxpayers millions of dollars, may have muddied the
issues irretrievably.' 5 Reaction against any arrangement that relieved
ComSat from "fully" paying its own way would undoubtedly intensify
political obstacles which have virtually precluded the use in the
United States of marginal-cost pricing with public subsidy.
L13 In each case incremental cost would provide a minimum level for ComSat's
rates. The several principles of joint-cost allocation would then produce prices rang-
ing from marginal cost, on the one hand, to some maximum determined by options
(5) and (6). If principles (2), (3), and (4) were applied directly to price rather
than to the allocation of joint costs, somewhat different rates might result.
214 For a classic defense of marginal-cost pricing in the public utilities see
Vickrey, Some Objections to Marginal-Cost Pricing, 56 J. POL. EcoN. 218 (1948).
A highly useful review and critique of all aspects appears in BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES
OF PuBLIc UrrLry RAm s 317-36, 386-406 (1961).
115The unfortunate legislative history of the Communications Satellite Act
virtually precludes any reliance on Government subsidy. A private joint venture
was justified partly as a way to develop the system without extensive Government
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(2) Distribution of joint costs according to user's ability to pay
would have great psychological appeal to the poorer nations. Since
wide disparities of income affect the social acceptability of full-cost
pricing, ComSat might be pressed by poorer nations to combine
incremental-cost pricing, once adopted, with a surcharge based on
user's ability to pay. Such a pricing arrangement, however, is likely
to result in an increase in the system's unused capacity by raising
its average per unit costs. As a means to reduce income disparities,
falsification of relative prices is, furthermore, inferior to explicit money
grants to less fortunate groups or nations. Money grants are also
more consistent with economic efficiency than pricing by ability-to-pay
with cost differences ignored.-"
(3) Distribution of joint costs on a diffusion-of-benefit principle
also involves waiver of the surcharge in whole or in part for users
in some markets. Such pricing might even require that some segments
be priced below marginal cost to promote their "premature" use.'
The basic charge, however, would be equal to marginal costs. Thus
the main difference between variation of surcharges according to
ability-to-pay and diffusion-of-benefits would be the attempt, under
diffusion pricing, to anticipate the effects on economic growth and
productivity.
(4) Developing nations may in fact prefer an equal sharing of
joint costs to an option that reflects relative incremental costs on the
several links (5) or relative demand elasticities (6). This would be
especially true where pricing by ability to pay or diffusion of benefits
has been rejected.
Equal sharing of joint costs, or equal apportionment of total
costs, again jeopardizes efficiency. In economically advanced markets,
for example, where inexpensive alternatives to the satellite are readily
available, potential customers would use the satellite only so long as
it was cheaper than expansion of their overland cable or microwave
aid. The continuing controversy over the terms on which NASA should provide
ComSat with booster facilities, research, and know-how indicates how sensitive this
area remains. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Communications of the
Senate Committee on Conmnerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3, at 56-64 (1963)
(Pastore, Monroney, Dryden); Hearings on Nomination of Incorporators Before
the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
77-91 (1963) (Senator Stuart Symington, Sundlun, ComSat).
116 BONBRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 114, at 116-17.
117 Pricing below incremental cost can be justified where social benefits exceed
private benefits-for example, the facilitation of population-and industrial benefits-
decentralization for national security through below-cost pricing of railroad service, or
the subsidization of rapid transit to relieve highway congestion. Id. at 112-13. Like-
wise pricing above marginal cost is justifiable where social cost exceeds private cost,
e.g., in the pricing of peak-hour subway service. See id. at 118. See generally id.
at 117-119.
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links. Pricing at incremental cost would enable the corporation to
compete effectively in such markets. Allocation of any of the system's
joint costs to customers in advanced markets would lead to diversion of
their business elsewhere. The result would be higher average total
costs for the users who remain and greater idle satellite capacity.
Uniform rates, or an equal sharing of joint costs superimposed
on a basic charge set at marginal cost, are also inequitable since in-
cremental costs and demand elasticities may vary on different segments
of the system."' Spurious equalitarianism may have superficial appeal
for the poorer partners, so long as they are unable to secure outright
grants, but it is conducive to neither fairness nor efficiency.
(5) The apportionment of joint costs according to the relative
size of incremental costs on each of the system's links is justified by
the theory that, if fully-distributed costs are to serve as an approxima-
tion of reasonable rates, total costs should be apportioned "to reflect
relative differential or incremental or marginal costs, not absolute
costs. . . . Fully apportioned costs, then, should reflect cost rela-
tionships, not absolute costs." 19 Here rates would be proportional
to marginal costs and hence arguably "nondiscriminatory." 120 Because
long-run incremental costs in the various markets will be comparable
for the present, however, there would be little difference between rates
calculated on this basis and rates based on an equal allocation of joint
costs. Consequently the same criticism applies to both.
(6) In the future, when traffic becomes heavy and demand
presses on capacity, ComSat might differentiate in its rates between
peak and off-peak services. By allowing rates to determine the market
for both products, so far as possible, ComSat would necessarily dif-
ferentiate in favor of the off-peak service. 1  Such rate differentials
may not be termed discriminatory, however, because the cost of
on-peak service (the main product) would include all incremental
capacity costs, while the costs of off-peak service (the by-product)
would include separable costs only."s  Once more the rate differentials
would ultimately reflect relative marginal costs, and the result would be
more effective use of plant. But, if we assume that per unit production
costs will decline substantially over the relevant range of output, the
revenues generated would again fail to cover total costs.
11
8 See generally id. at 124-26, 130-34.
119 Id. at 340-41.
12 0 See generally id. at 375-77.
121 Cf. id. at 381.
=2Id. at 359.
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To generate adequate revenues, ComSat must institute some form
of value-of-service pricing, allocating the system's joint costs among
its several links according to the respective demand elasticities on those
links. The resulting rate differentials will then exceed those justi-
fiable by any cost allocation strictly based on cost relationships, but this
discrimination offers an assured way of covering total costs." Such
pricing is not objectionable provided that even users who pay the
relatively higher rates still benefit because the favored users, otherwise
priced out of the market, now pay incremental costs plus something
extra toward joint costs.' But value-of-service discrimination should
never be allowed unless the favored users are charged for long-run,
not merely short-run, marginal costs.
Incremental-cost pricing in markets having readily-available,
cheap alternatives would force ComSat to shift its joint costs else-
where. It could shift them, for example, to its transoceanic links,
where potential demand is high but conventional facilities are far more
costly than overland cable or microwave links, or to links in the
developing countries, where, for the limited capacity now needed, the
best conventional alternatives are also very expensive. In both cases
common carriers would be willing to pay considerably more than
incremental cost for needed channel capacity.
Premium pricing of this type is economically sound insofar as
all users would pay lower rates if those in the most competitive
markets, willing to pay no more than incremental cost, are charged
no more than incremental cost. However, such pricing would pre-
cipitate serious complaints that ComSat had met competition in the
wealthier countries, where conventional facilities are convenient and
inexpensive, by exploiting links subject to weaker competition. In
the final analysis, therefore, intransigent congressional insistence on
ComSat paying its own way may force adoption of pricing principles
that injure the Nation's image abroad. Some form of incremental-cost
pricing with prorated subsidy may be the only practical way to reconcile
efficiency with subjective notions of fairness.
2. Government Policy and Relay Pricing
No pricing analysis can ignore the possibility of renewed pressures
on ComSat to lease channels to the United States Government at
preferential rates-in partial repayment for its large role in develop-
'= Cf. id. at 359-60.
14 See generally id. at 383-84.
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ment. Such rate reductions would presumably require the imposition
of higher charges to nongovernment users, since ComSat and its
carrier stockholders would seem to have little opportunity or incentive
to shift onto their equipment-manufacturing subsidiaries the burden
of such concessions.
Even if it does not seek price concessions, the Government may
still seek a favorable allocation of its business between commercial and
Government-owned satellite facilities. Even the Defense Department
presently uses commercial transportation and communications facilities
when spreading commercial overhead is more economical than creating
its own and where security is no obstacle. In view of the Defense
Department's plan to establish its own satellite system, 2 ' ComSat
cannot ignore the comparable possibility of a Government desire to
spread the overhead of that satellite system (created to handle
"unique" Government needs), instead of utilizing an admittedly
monopolistic commercial system. Of course, the Government may in
fact be unable to switch its business from ComSat to idle channels on
a Government system when ComSat's rates are too high, 2 ' or it
might be unwilling to assume responsibility for raising ComSat's
rates still further. 2 In any case ComSat's pricing policy for the
foreseeable future is sure to be affected by Government purchasing
policy and practice.
Furthermore, the pricing of NASA's facilities and know-how
will necessarily affect the magnitude of the satellite system's joint
and residual costs and thereby of ComSat's pricing problems. The
125 See generally Hearings on H.R. 1140 Before Senate Foreign Relations Corn-
mittee, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 59-66, 91-2 (Morse, Minow), 129, 136-40, 235-38 (Morse,
Murrow), 188-90 (Morse, Rusk). Eighteen nations already hold stock in the system.
If they too sought preferential rates, their bargaining power would depend on their
capacity to contribute to R&D, their strategic value as sites for terminal stations,
the danger of precipitating any movement toward internationalization, or towards
the withdrawal of regional blocs intent on creating their own system. See Rand
Memorandum RM-3484-RC, at 51, 58-62.
126 See Langer, CornSat II: Commercial System To Avoid Tie With Defense
Department, 146 SciENcE 751 (1964); Business Week, July 18, 1964, p. 36.
127 Suggestive of the possible inadequacy of sections 102(d) and 201(a) (6)
on this point are the fears voiced in Hearings on H.R. 1140 Before Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 180, 203-5 (Morse, Rusk), 233 (Morse,
Murrow), 282-84 (Morse, Dryden), 300-05 (Gore, Robert McNamara).
128 During its early years AT&T and the Government will undoubtedly be Com-
Sat's main customers. See note 43 supra. Loss of either client's major business could
price ComSat completely out of the market. Yet separate military systems might
still be desirable for national security. Insofar as they eliminated foreign sensi-
tivities about extensive military use of a commercial system, they would also en-
courage maximum foreign participation in ComSat (as stockholders and users),
thus offsetting any loss of strictly military business. See Rand Memorandum RM-
3484-RC, at 22-26. Foreign governments might conceivably be willing to tolerate
some routine United States governmental or military use of ComSat, as they now do
of jointly-owned cable links, to guarantee its viability and the chance of lower charges.
Id. at 22-23.
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more that NASA charges ComSat for booster-tracking facilities or
space research, for example, the greater would be the deficit that
results from incremental-cost pricing on the system's several links.
The greater, therefore, would be ComSat's subsequent difficulties in
reconciling fairness and efficiency. The situation is further comp-
licated, however, by the fact that NASA's pricing arrangements could
also serve to recover for the whole community at least some of the
Government's equity in any satellite system.
NASA's choices are: (1) charging ComSat only for marginal
launching costs in order to stimulate growth; (2) charging for some
portion of overhead, including past development costs, to recover the
community's equity; (3) leasing launch facilities to aerospace com-
panies for limited, renewable periods at varying rental fees; or (4) per-
mitting them to be built outright by private companies under Govern-
ment license. NASA could also vary its charges inversely to ComSat's
willingness to divulge resulting technical information, or to allow
NASA royalty-free, nonexclusive patents.129  In the extreme NASA
could even provide booster and related services without charge, there-
after recovering marginal launching costs, plus some development
costs, through long-run concessions in the rates which the Government
would subsequently pay to use ComSat's facilities.' Finally, NASA's
pricing decision could be determined independently of any attempt
to recover the Government's equity in the system.
IV. CONCLUSION
ComSat was not created because "no entry would [otherwise]
take place." ' The Government or AT&T could have acted alone;
or separate companies could have established individual segments of
a global relay. Nor was the corporation "the only way in which the
participants could themselves achieve the economies [and other goals]
or undertake the risks." 'a The carriers had already proposed a
consortium. Nor, finally, was ComSat "with [its] . . . participants
. . .the only effective way in which the goals could have been .
129 The prototype here is the cooperative agreement between NASA and AT&T
to launch Telstar. If this option were used, ComSat would actually (1) reimburse
NASA for marginal launching-tracking costs only; (2) divulge all technical infor-
mation which results; and (3) grant NASA nonexclusive, royalty-free licenses on
any patents which result, and permission to sublease licenses as well. See Kefauver
Hearings II, at 584-90 (cooperative agreement between NASA and AT&T).
130 Compare Congress' free land grants to the railroads in the last century.
Their market value was recovered subsequently through reduced rates and free
passage for certain classes of users.
181 KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY-AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
137 (1959).
1321 d. at 139.
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reached." M Clearly, there were other viable arrangements includ-
ing, if time allowed, a venture limited to newcomers with in-
terests unrelated to communications. Rather, ComSat was preferred
to other options as a better way to reconcile speedy growth, wide
diffusion, service to unprofitable markets, and private ownership. It
was not expected to maximize each of these goals; it was always clear
that some other option could promote one or more of them more
effectively.
Whether ComSat will succeed in its task of reconciliation depends
in part on the adequacy of both its intracorporate safeguards and the
numerous external constraints imposed by Congress. But manage-
ment's exercise of discretion will still determine ComSat's performance.
Awareness of the potential dangers inherent in the corporation's
economic-regulatory framework is therefore of special importance.
An American-dominated joint venture in control of the sole
global satellite relay is highly vulnerable to Sino-Soviet propaganda
even if ComSat were successful in providing low-cost efficient service
to all. To avoid serious impairment of international confidence in
American leadership in space communication, therefore, foreclosed or
inequitable access by any class of users or suppliers must be prevented,
collusion among the co-owners in their outside business ventures must
be thwarted, attempts to rig ComSat policies to protect earlier invest-
ments in "outmoded" satellite or cable systems must be rigorously
avoided.
133 Ibid.
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